

Web 2.0 applications written in JavaScript handle sensitive information.

**Information flow analysis** is an important security problem.

### Information flow...

...can be direct

`if(x){h} else{false} → h` or `false`  
h directly affects the result

...can be indirect

`if(h){true} else{false} → true (= h)` or `false (= h)`  
h indirectly affects the result

We want to determine **statically** which subexpressions can affect the result.

### JavaScript is hard!

- **eval** lets programs run strings as code
- So use **staged metaprogramming** instead:
- limit manipulation to splicing  
well-formed code templates
- still have to handle static and dynamic scoping and loss of alpha equivalence

`(fun(x){x + 1})`  
↑ evaluates like  
`eval("(fun(x) {" + "x + 1" + "})")`  
↓ with staged metaprogramming  
`run(box(fun(x){unbox(box(x + 1))}))`


### Our Analysis

1. Mark expressions of interest → 2. **CFA** → 3. Generate information flow constraints

`((fun(x){  
  I : (fun(y){x})  
})(H : 1))(L : 2)  
→* 1`


Use different **markers** for different security levels.

`let x = L : 1 in  
let c = box x in  
let x = H : 2 in  
run c  
→* 2`



CFA: standard analysis that determines which abstract values occur at **program points**.

Extension to handle staged metaprogramming:  
• abstract value **BOX(x)** models a code value x...  
• ...or anything x evaluates to –  
this keeps the needed **abstract values** finite



### What we have done...

- first analysis of its **kind**
- an implementation in OCaml
- a soundness proof in Coq

### Still to do...

- automate transformation to staged metaprogramming
- improve precision of analysis of strings, numbers...
- support full JavaScript: mutable state, exceptions...